

■ International Symposium ■

# Discussing Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations

How to Re-establish ROK-Japan Relations Ushering in an Era of Momentous Shift

Date

August 26, 2021(Thu), 10:00~17:20(KST)



Host



**NRC**

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL FOR  
ECONOMICS, HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Organizers



Seoul National University  
Institute for Japanese Studies

# Discussing Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations

How to Re-establish ROK-Japan Relations Ushering in an Era of Momentous Shift

## Program

Facilitator: **KIM Yi-Gyo** | Director General, Center for Research Strategy, NRC

10:00~10:05 **Opening, Introduction of VIPs**

10:05~10:25 **Opening Ceremony**

Opening Remarks **JUNG Hae-Gu** | Chairperson, NRC

Welcoming Remarks **KIM Kye-Hong** | President, KLRI

**KIM Hyun-Chul** | Professor, Institute for Japanese Studies, SNU

Congratulatory Remarks **LEE Su-hoon** | Former Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan

10:25~11:05 **Keynote Speech**

Keynote Speech 1 **Mutual Recognition, Reconciliation and Cooperation**

**CHOI Sang-Yong** | Former Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan

Keynote Speech 2 **HATOYAMA Yukio** | Former Japanese Prime Minister

11:05~11:15 **Photo Session & Break**

11:15~12:45 **[Session 1] Region, Gender and Generation:  
At the Forefront of Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations**

Moderator **LEE Su-hoon** | Former Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan

Presentation 1 **Exchange between Korean and Japanese Local Governments**

**LEE Jinwon** | Professor, University of Seoul

Presentation 2 **Japan-Korea Relations and Gender Gap**

**HARUKI Ikumi** | Researcher, Institute of Korean Studies, Waseda University

Presentation 3 **KWON Yong Suk** | Professor, Hitotsubashi University

Discussions **JUNG Miae** | Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute

**FUKUSHIMA Minori** | Associate Professor, Tokoha University

**MATSUTANI Motokazu** | Associate Professor, Tohoku Gakuin University

12:45~14:00 **Lunch Break**

14:00~15:30 **[Session 2] The Structure and Aspect of Great Transformation  
in ROK-Japan Relations**

Moderator **YI Sun-Tae** | Director General, Department of Legislative Research, KLRI

Presentation 1 **Reconstructing Korea-Japan Relationship:**

**Structural Conditions and Strategic Directions**

**SOHN Yul** | Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University



Presentation 2	<b>The Structural Transformation of South Korea–Japan Relations amid the US–China Strategic Rivalries and North Korean Nuclear Crisis : What is our choice?</b> <b>KIMIYA Tadashi</b>   Professor, The University of Tokyo
Presentation 3	<b>Schadenfreude is not Recommended</b> <b>Brad GLOSSERMAN</b>   Deputy Director, Center for Rule making Strategies, Tama University
Discussions	<b>LEE Kang–Kook</b>   Professor, Ritsumeikan University <b>CHOI Hwan–Yong</b>   Senior Principal Research Fellow, KLRI <b>KUMAGAI Naoko</b>   Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
15:30~15:40	<b>Break</b>
15:40~17:10	<b>[Session 3] Direction and Strategies for the Re-establishment of ROK–Japan Relations</b>
Moderator	<b>JO Yanghyeon</b>   Professor, Center for Japanese Studies, KNDA
Presentation 1	<b>ROK’s Middle Power Diplomacy and the Redefinition of ROK–Japan Relations: Challenges and Prospect</b> <b>NAM Kijeong</b>   Professor, Institute for Japanese Studies, SNU
Presentation 2	<b>Japan and South Korea as Natural Partners: Concept and Common Agenda</b> <b>SOEYA Yoshihide</b>   Professor Emeritus, Keio University
Presentation 3	<b>Legal Issues between Korea and Japan: A Critical Review and Suggested Solutions</b> <b>RHEE Yongil</b>   Former Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Ivory Coast
Discussions	<b>LEE Chiwon</b>   Professor, Hallym University <b>ENDO Ken</b>   Professor, Hokkaido University <b>LI Tingting</b>   Associate Professor, Peking University
17:10~17:20	<b>Closing Ceremony</b>

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■ International Symposium ■

# Discussing Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations

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in an Era of Momentous Shift

**Opening Ceremony**







# Opening Remarks

## **JUNG Hae-Gu**

Chairperson, The National Research Council for Economics,  
Humanities and Social Sciences



Distinguished guests.

I am Jung Hae-Gu, Chairperson of the National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences (NRC).

First of all, I would like to sincerely thank our distinguished guests from home and abroad for joining us in this important symposium despite your busy schedules. In particular, allow me to express my appreciation to President Kim Kye-Hong of the Korea Legislation Research Institute and Director Kim Hyun-Chul of the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University, all of whom spared no effort in putting together this meaningful symposium. My thanks also go to the honorable Lee Su-hoon, former South Korean Ambassador to Japan who will deliver welcome remarks, and the honorable Choi Sang-Yong, former South Korean Ambassador to Japan who will give a keynote speech, I would also like to extend my gratitude to the former Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio and experts from all across the world who will actively join today's presentations and discussions.

Since Japan's export restrictions on South Korea (July 1, 2019), conflicts between South Korea and Japan have transitioned from centering on the past to now focusing even on economic and diplomatic issues. Consequently, ROK-Japan relations have been showing no signs of improvement. The direct cause of such conflicts, of course, can be found in the two countries' seldom narrowing gap in perception regarding how best to solve their historical issues, which had previously been sealed beneath the triangular relationship between the ROK-US-Japan during the Cold War era but have since risen to the forefront.

However, there is another reason behind the currently worsening ROK-Japan relations which is perhaps more important than the first. That is, the global environment surrounding ROK-Japan relations is markedly different from that of the Cold War era during which the relationship between South Korea and Japan was founded on the hierarchical division of labor amidst the triangular relations of the ROK-US-Japan. These days, however, South Korea's global status has risen significantly and therefore current

ROK-Japan relations have become more horizontalized. Moreover, South Korea prioritizes the Korean Peninsula peace process, whereas Japan puts more emphasis on the US-Japan alliance to strengthen the frontline against North Korea and China, resulting in considerable differences in the two countries' respective future plans.

In consideration of these situational changes, I think the future relations of South Korea and Japan need to be re-established and made different from those of the past. To this end, we should admit the differences in our perceptions and understandings of the past while trying to seek new areas and issues through which we can communicate and share our thoughts with each other, fostering the kind of relationship wherein we can admit our differences while exploring the things we have in common. This is why we have selected the theme of today's symposium as "Discussing Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations".

If we view our national interests not with a top-down approach but with the bottom-up approach of the public and their livelihood, or if we view the situation from the perspective of the future rather than of the past, we can uncover numerous areas in which South Korea and Japan can communicate and share with one another. For instance, both countries have been facing crises of regional area extinction due to sharp declines in their populations, although to different degrees. South Korea and Japan can share their experiences and policies regarding such issues. Another example is the climate crisis which is not limited to South Korea and Japan but is an issue facing the entire global community. The two countries can cooperate closely to address the climate crisis in Northeast Asia.

Since its foundation in August 2019, the Japan research group of the NRC has held several debates and conducted vast research on pending issues between South Korea and Japan. By extension of such efforts, I sincerely hope that this symposium will serve as a great opportunity to share meaningful insights and engage in discussions for ROK-Japan cooperation in the future. I thank you all for joining today's symposium which is unfortunately being held online due to COVID-19, and I wish you good health and good fortune.

August 26, 2021

**JUNG Hae-Gu**

Chairperson of the National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences (NRC)

# Welcoming Remarks

**KIM Kye-Hong**

President, Korea Legislation Research Institute



Distinguished guests,

I am Kim Kye-Hong, President of the Korea Legislation Research Institute.

Today, I would like to sincerely welcome you all to this International Symposium aimed at discussing great transformation in ROK-Japan relations, which is being hosted by the National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences (NRC) and jointly organized by the Korea Legislation Research Institute and the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University (SNU).

First, allow me to express my appreciation to President Jung Hae-Gu of the NRC, the honorable Lee Su-hoon, former South Korean Ambassador to Japan, and Director Kim Hyun-Chul of the Institute for Japanese Studies at SNU, all of whom spared no effort in putting together this international symposium on South Korea-Japan relations, which marks its 3rd anniversary this year despite the difficult circumstances.

My thanks also go to the honorable Choi Sangyong, former South Korean Ambassador to Japan, and former Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, both of whom will serve as keynote speakers sharing their active interest in and affection for South Korea-Japan relations. I would also like to welcome and extend my gratitude to the experts from all across the world who will actively join today's presentations and discussions and to the moderators who will ensure the sessions proceed smoothly.

We are gathered here today under the theme of "How to Re-establish ROK-Japan Relations Ushering in an Era of Momentous Shift" in order to explore various means to recover from the strained ROK-Japan relations and re-establish them, thereby putting our relations back on a desirable path.

These are highly difficult tasks. On the occasion of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games, we expected to have a summit and achieve harmony through thrilling sports events and spirited competition so as to find clues on how to ease the strain on ROK-Japan relations. Once again, however, we had to take a rain check.

Although we are currently facing many constraints such as issues related to the Japanese military's forced mobilization and sexual slavery, export restrictions, the Japan boycott movement, and limited exchange in the private sector due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we must nonetheless continue to meet, hold discussions, and find solutions for future generations.

I hope today's symposium will serve in part as the prelude to increasing exchange led by local governments and the private sector; to approaching ROK-Japan issues in consideration of gender and generational differences in the perception of the two country's bilateral relations; to shedding light on ROK-Japan relations amidst the international order; and more.

President Moon said that "Korea and Japan have long been able to achieve economic growth together through a division of labor and cooperation based on the common shared values of democracy and a market economy." As such, Korea and Japan are mirror images of one another and are important neighbors. We should grow together while cooperating and jointly responding to threats facing the globe such as COVID-19 and the climate crisis, among others.

In this regard, today's symposium provides a very meaningful and valuable forum for Korean and Japanese experts to come together and hold discussions on/offline despite the setbacks caused by COVID-19.

Thank you once again for your efforts in putting together this symposium and for your participation. I hope these kinds of events will continue to be held in the future as well.

Thank you.

August 26, 2021

**KIM Kye-Hong**

President of the Korea Legislation Research Institute

# Welcoming Remarks

**KIM Hyun-Chul**

Professor, Institute for Japanese Studies, Seoul National University



Distinguished guests. My name is Kim Hyun-Chul, and I am the Director of the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University.

Distinguished guests here in attendance, I would like to sincerely welcome you to the International Symposium which is being jointly hosted by the National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences, Korea Legislation Research Institute and Seoul National University's Institute for Japanese Studies.

I would like to offer my deepest gratitude, for all the efforts several individuals made in hosting this symposium despite the COVID-19 situation. They are Jung Hae-Gu, the Chairperson of the National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences, Lee Su-hoon, the Former Ambassador of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan, and Kim Kye-Hong, the President of the Korea Legislation Research Institute.

Moreover, I would like to offer my deepest gratitude to and sincerely welcome all those who will deliver keynote presentations today despite their busy schedules including Hatoyama Yukio, the Former Japanese Prime Minister, and Choi Sangyong, the Former Ambassador of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan. In particular, it brings me great pleasure to see the Former Prime Minister Hatoyama in good health since I met him two years earlier when he visited Seoul to commemorate the publication of the Korean version of his book, "Departing from Great Japanism."

Distinguished guests, as you are aware, the current Korea-Japan relationship is very tense. On top of the conflicts over history there are economic and security disputes that have slowed the Korea-Japan relationship to a standstill. Ten years have passed since this situation began in 2012. Some say we are facing a "lost decade" in the Korea-Japan relationship, and others say that we are in a "new normal" in terms of conflict.

I feel, in order to free ourselves from this dilemma, we need to answer two fundamental questions. The first is “How did we get in such a situation?” This symposium intends to search for the answer to this question among structural causes. This is why “the Great Transformation,” was chosen for the wording in symposium’s title.

The second question is “How are we getting out of it?” This symposium will look at the new sensations of region, gender and the new generation while seeking directions and strategies to newly establish the Korea-Japan relationship.

This symposium is the third of its kind to be jointly sponsored by the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University. Moving forward, I wish that this venue will continue and that we can seek a new Korea-Japan relationship.

Thank you.

August 26, 2021

**KIM Hyun-Chul**

Professor of the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University

# Congratulatory Remarks

**LEE Su-hoon**

Former Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan



I feel it is of great significance that prominent scholars from China and the United States, along with those from Korea and Japan, are here in attendance at this International Symposium being held under the theme of “the Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations.” This is because while this is a venue for experts from Korea and Japan to discuss this path we are on – a worsening Korea-Japan relationship, having scholars from third party countries join us in the discussion enables us to take an even better vantage point from which to view this theme of “the Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations.” Now, for hosting today’s significant international conference, I would like to offer my gratitude and congratulations to Jung Hae-Gu, Chairperson of the National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences. Also, for sponsoring this conference, I would like to extend my gratitude and congratulations to Kim Kye-Hong, President of the Korea Legislation Research Institute, and Kim Hyun-Chul, Director of the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University.

When scholars speak of “a Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations,” we could suppose this carries a serious tone. It could have the primary meaning that the relational frame that once supported the Korea-Japan relationship is in the past and is no longer functioning. Furthermore, it could have the secondary meaning of a new relational frame that could redefine the Korea-Japan relationship as yet to be erected. It could even be expressed as a “crisis,” nor would it be wrong to call it a transition period. This great transformation is marked by confusion. This is the very reason why the Korea-Japan relationship was troubled and unpredictable. The Korea-Japan relationship could be compared to as being trapped in a dark tunnel. Those in the tunnel have no choice but to experience pain and displeasure. Time is needed to exit this tunnel, and it is very crucial that many people make wise efforts.

The current state of affairs in East Asia are such that the Korea-Japan relationship is not the only aspect that is suffering in pain. The regional order overall is drifting further and further from collaboration, coexistence and peace. More than anything, the hegemonic rivalry between the United States and China is intensifying and sending tremors of tension in the regional order of the entire area.

The problem across the Taiwan Straits is once again surfacing and becoming an issue. How about the North Korean nuclear problem? The opposition between North Korea and the United States has made denuclearization seem far off, but the standstill in the North and South Korea relationship is, of course, a threat to our peace. Each of these problems do not stand alone, but are rather connected.

From this standpoint, the task at hand is not to discuss the “the Great Transformation in the Korea-Japan Relationship.” Having Korea and Japan respond properly to the great transformation and provide a constructive relational frame would be a splendid feat that would create an impact that goes well beyond the Korea-Japan relationship and would impact the entire regional order in East Asia. The creation of a regional order of collaboration, coexistence, peace and joint prosperity would enable us to discover a breakthrough in the Great Transformation in the Korea-Japan Relationship.

A great deal of discussion is paramount to properly respond to the great transformation. Of course, governments must discuss with each other, but communication is also crucial among experts, as are exchanges and discussions among civic groups in the work of responding to the great transformation. In order to conduct discussions, a joint goal must be established, and built on the premise of open and bi-directional stances. Momentum must be created through open and bi-directional stances even through the Korea-Japan relationship is currently at a standstill in terms of discussions between the two governments.

Through this International Symposium, I look forward to experts sharing their honest opinions about their awareness of the problem, this sharing then spreading and progressing into broader discussions between the two countries of Korea and Japan.

Thank you.

August 26, 2021

**LEE Su-hoon**

Former Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan



International Symposium

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in an Era of Momentous Shift

## Keynote Speech

# Mutual Recognition, Reconciliation and Cooperation

Keynote Speech 1:  
**CHOI Sang-Yong**

Former Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan

Keynote Speech 2:  
**HATOYAMA Yukio**

Former Japanese Prime Minister





MEMO

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International Symposium

## Discussing Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations

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### Session 1

# Region, Gender and Generation: At the Forefront of Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations



Moderator:

**LEE Su-hoon**

Former Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan

- 1987.03 ~ Present: Professor, Department of Sociology, Kyungnam University
- 2020.03: Chaired Professor, Kyungnam University
- 2017.10: Ambassador to Japan
- 2015.04: Visiting Professor, Keio University
- 2009.02: Director, IFES, Kyungnam University
- 2005.08: President, Presidential Committee of Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative
- 2002.07: Executive Member, International Sociological Association
- 1997.05: President, Korea Association of Comparative Sociology





# Exchange between Korean and Japanese Local Governments



**LEE Jinwon**  
Professor, University of Seoul

- 1998 ~ Present: Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Seoul
- 2017 ~ 2019: Chairman, Korea Association of Japanology
- 2015 ~ 2017: Expert Advisor, National Research Foundation of Korea Social Science Group
- 2015 ~ 2016: Publication Ethics Committee, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism
- 2014 ~ 2015: Vice President for Academic Affairs, University of Seoul
- 2010 ~ 2012: Dean, College of Public Affairs and Economics

## Biography

Lee Jinwon graduated from Tohoku University in Japan with a PhD degree. Lee Jinwon is currently a professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Seoul. The subjects that Lee Jinwon is in charge of are Japanese-related classes, including Japanese politics.

Lee Jinwon's field of study is Japanese local politics. He especially studies the history of the process of establishing Japan's local autonomy system. Lee Jinwon sees this era as the era of glocalization and emphasizes the importance of local government. Lee Jinwon argues that local governments in the glocalization era must have their own diplomacy tailored to their situation. And Lee Jinwon is conducting research focusing on the international relations of local governments. Lee Jinwon has recently published a paper on the current state of local diplomacy in the Tohoku region of Japan, and will continue to pursue research to analyze the current state of diplomacy of Japanese local governments.





# Exchange between Korean and Japanese local governments

Univ. of Seoul  
Jinwon Lee

## Meaning of international exchange of local governments

- ▶ Glocalization
- ▶ The end of the era of national monopolization of information
- ▶ Residents are interested in the policies of local governments that are directly related to their lives
- ▶ Shift of the responsibility to implement political, economic, and social activities from the central government to local government; decentralization
- ▶ International affairs: Relationships between local governments and citizens are important
- ▶ Local governments focus on international exchange, with the active support by the central government
- ▶ Revitalize exchanges between Korean and Japanese local governments

## Document

▶ 전국시도지사협의회

<https://www.gaok.or.kr/gaok/exchange/listField.do?menuNo=200083>(2021년 5월 10일 검색)

▶ 自治體 國際化協議會

<http://www.clair.or.jp/j/exchange/jirei/chousa.html>(2021년 3월 31일 검색)

## Internationalization of local governments and exchange between Korea and Japan


전국시도지사협의회

<http://exchange.gaok.or.kr/exchange/list.action>(2021년 5월 10일, 11일 검색) 참고로 작성

## The number and the percentage of Japanese cities among the total sister cities of Korea


region	Foreign municipality (Wide-area local government )	Wide-area local government in Japan	%	Foreign municipality (Basics-area local government )	Basics-area local government in Japan	%
total	348	48	13.8%	1015	161	15.9%
Seoul	71	2	2.8%	147	11	7.5%
Busan	37	4	10.8%	47	5	10.6%
Daegu	25	2	8.0%	27	1	3.7%
Incheon	37	3	8.1%	53	2	3.8%
Gwangju	22	2	9.1%	13	0	0.0%
Daejeon	34	3	8.8%	12	0	0.0%
Ulsan	20	3	15.0%	23	1	4.3%
Sejong	4	0	0.0%	0	0	
Gyeonggi	40	2	5.0%	217	28	12.9%
Gangwon	29	2	6.9%	113	26	23.0%
Chungbuk	16	1	6.3%	54	8	14.8%
Chungnam	28	3	10.7%	96	18	18.8%
Jeonbuk	10	2	20.0%	69	9	13.0%
Jeonnam	30	5	16.7%	123	14	11.4%
Gyongbuk	27	0	0.0%	114	18	15.8%
Gyongnam	24	4	16.7%	116	20	17.2%
Jeju	14	10	71.4%	24	0	

## The percentage of Japanese cities among the total sister cities of Korea(by decade)




## Exchange between Korean and Japanese local governments


### Sister cities of Korea and Japan (by decade)



## The number of exchange projects (by decade)



## The number of projects for each exchange relationship (by decade)




## The contents of exchange between Korean and Japanese local governments


### Examples of items in the field of international exchange

Administrative exchange	Delegation mutual visit, Administrative information exchange, Exchange 10th Anniversary Ceremony, etc.
Human interaction	Public servant (mutual) dispatch, Civil servant training, Mutual visit of adolescents, Home stay, University student exchange, etc.
Cultural art exchange	Festivals, art performances, Go and calligraphy exchange exhibitions, art exhibitions, Hanbok fashion shows, etc.
Tourism exchange	Tourist product exhibition, school excursion, attraction of medical treatment, etc.
Adolescent exchange	Homestay, school trip, youth sports exchange, language training, international internship
Sports exchange	Goodwill Soccer Tournament, Goodwill Baseball Tournament, International Track and Field Tournament, etc.
Technology / academic exchange	Administrative information symposium, international symposium held, agricultural technology training, industrial training, etc.
Economic exchange	Concluding economic exchange agreement, dispatching market development, holding economic talks, international internship, chamber of commerce exchange, investment, direct flight opening, technology transfer discussion, etc.
Private non-governmental exchange	Chamber of Commerce Exchange, Art Association, Physician Association, etc. Private School Exchange, University Student Exchange Program, etc.
Symbol business	Park creation, sister city exhibition hall opening, honorary citizenship award, etc.
others	Medical service, Makoto Kinden, Assistance, Animal Donation, etc.


## The number of exchanges by field (wide-area local government)




## The ratio of exchanges by field (wide-area local government)



## The number of exchanges by field (basic-area local government)



## The ratio of exchanges by field (basic-area local government)





## Challenges and prospects

- ▶ Exchanges between local governments of Korea and Japan are very active
- ▶ The content is diversified as the number of exchanges increases
- ▶ The exchanges between Korean and Japanese local governments are increasing in substance.



The exchange between South Korea and Japan is likely to be centered on the local governments level.



# Japan-Korea Relations and Gender Gap



**HARUKI Ikumi**

Researcher, Institute of Korean Studies, Waseda University

- 2013-2014: Visiting Research Fellow, Center for Asian Studies, American University
- 2011-2016: Lecturer, Tokyo University
- 2009-2016: Associate professor with Tenure of Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, Toyo Eiwa University
- 2008-2010: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Research Fellow, The Japan-ROK Joint History Research Committee (Modern and Contemporary history)
- 2006-2008: Research Fellow, Graduate School of Law, Keio University






## South Korea-Japan Relations and gender gap

1. Gender gap in how Japanese people perceive Korea
2. Factors that cause gender gap
3. What implications does it have on South Korea-Japan relations
  - Limitations and outlook


Number of cross-border visits between South Korea-Japan




Source: Japan National Tourism Organization, Korea Tourism Organization

## Total number of Japanese visitors to South Korea in 2018 by age group and gender

(Source: Korea Tourism Organization)



Trends in the proportion of Japanese people that feel an affinity for South Korea (by age)




Note. Values show the aggregate of responses 'feel strong affinity' and 'feel some affinity'

Reference. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, *Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy*

### Affinity toward Korea

(Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy)




**“Do you think that the future development of South Korea-Japan relations is important for the two countries, and for Asia and the Pacific region?”**


(Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy, 2020)



○ Major study abroad destinations and the number of Japanese studying abroad (2018)



Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Survey on the Number of Japanese Studying Abroad, and





**I Increased affinity toward the Korean wave and Korea**  
 Japanese people's perceptions of Korea differ  
 by gender and generation

**III Tendency to consume K-Culture as a counter-culture**  
 that is in a different dimension from deteriorating  
 South Korea-Japan relations

## How different age groups perceive Korea - factors of fondness and affinity

- (1) How women aged 10-29 view Korea K-Culture as a counter-culture  
 K-Culture creating ideal images that they view with admiration  
 Background: The market and K-content shifted their target to younger generations
- (2) Women aged 20-49  
 Interest in feminism and identifying as feminists, cultural similarities in empowerment
- (3) Women aged 40 and older 'Nostalgic Korea' ⇒ Desire for an updated set of values that can be found in neighboring countries



## The significance of gender gap in South Korea-Japan relations

### 1. The Korean Wave - Consumption of K-Culture and its byproducts

'Spreading an advanced image', impact of public diplomacy, job creation

### 2. Influence on South Korea-Japan relations


- Absence of women in decision-making spheres or processes
- Gender imbalances among opinion leaders
- Magnitude of the gender gap between generations


### 3. Movements in other aspects

'Disputes over history' 'Seeking solidarity'

### 4. Changes and outlook

- Significant change in younger generations' perception of Korea (however, they do not know about 20<sup>th</sup>-century Korea)
- A gender gap has manifested among those aged 10-29 in their interest in Korea
- 'The silent majority' who do not participate in online discussions constitute a significant proportion





Today female students account for 70-80% of the participants in South Korea-Japan exchange programs for younger generations (programs, student exchange programs at universities)

Why?



<b>Korea-Japan Youth Exchange Program</b>	<b>Since 1986</b>
<b>Korea Japan Student Convention</b>	<b>Since 1986</b>
<b>Korea Japan School Forum</b>	<b>Since 1986</b>
<b>Korea-Japan High School Students Interchange Camp</b>	<b>Since 1993</b>
<b>Korea Japan Students Future Forum</b>	<b>Since 2005</b>



## Presentation 3

**KWON Yong Suk**

Professor, Hitotsubashi University





# MEMO

# MEMO



## MEMO



International Symposium

## Discussing Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations

How to Re-establish ROK-Japan Relations Ushering  
in an Era of Momentous Shift

### Session 2

# The Structure and Aspect of Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations

Moderator:

**YI Sun-Tae**

Director General, Department of Legislative Research, KLRI



- 2021 ~ Present: Director General, Department of Legislative Research, KLRI
- 2021 ~ Present: Auditor, Korean Local Government Law Association
- 2020 ~ Present: Auditor, Korean Public Law Association
- 2012.07 ~ 2012.12: Visiting Scholar, UC Berkeley
- 2007.12 ~ 2015.02: Member, Legislative Support Committee, National Assembly Secretariat
- 2005.10 ~ 2006.06: Research Professor, Pusan National University
- 2002.03: Doctor of Law, Osaka University





# Reconstructing Korea-Japan Relationship: Structural Conditions and Strategic Directions

**SOHN Yul**

Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University



- Present Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University
- Present Professor, Underwood International College, Yonsei University
- Present President, The East Asia Institute
- 2012 ~ 2016: Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University
- 2019: President, The Korean Association of International Studies
- 2012: President, The Association for Contemporary Japanese Studies

## Biography

Yul Sohn is the President of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor of the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) and Underwood International College at Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea. Sohn served President of the Korean Association of International Studies (KAIS) in 2019. He also served Dean of the GSIS (2012-2016) and President of the Association for Contemporary Japanese Studies (2012). Before joining the faculty at Yonsei, Sohn taught at Chung-Ang University, and was a visiting scholar at institutions in the University of Tokyo, Waseda University, the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and the University of California, Berkeley. Sohn has served as a policy advisor on a number of government advisory committees including Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation and the Korea Foundation.

Sohn has written extensively on Japanese and East Asian political economy, East Asian international relations, and public diplomacy. His most recent publications include *Japan and Asia's Contested Order* (2019, with T. J. Pempel) and *Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia* (2016, with Jan Melissen) both from Palgrave MacMillan, and "South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking," *The Pacific Review* (2019), 32, 6.



Hosted by the National Research Council for  
Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences  
(NRC)

# Reconstructing Korea-Japan Relationship: Structural Conditions and Strategic Directions

2021.08.26

**Sohn, Yul**

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## Menu

### Structural Conditions for Grand Transitions

1. The Lost Ten Years
2. US-China Strategic Rivalry
3. Shifting Power Balance between Japan and Korea

### Strategic Directions for Reconstruction

# (1) "Lost 10 Years" Worst ever in bilateral relations:


## Crisis of trust, 2012-2021.

- Emotional confrontation over interest
- Lack of communication at the leadership level  
: 10 years without official bilateral summits
- Emotional conflict → aggravated public opinion → exploit nationalist feelings by vilifying the other → spiral of tensions

## Spillover of political conflict to security and economics

- Negative spillover: Mutual distrust stemming from historical conflicts over Dokdo, Japanese military sexual slavery and forced mobilization has spilled over in all directions in the security and economic sectors.
- Downgrade the strategic value of the other
- Distancing and disciplining

Evaluation Of Current South Korea-Japan Relations (2013-20)  
EAI-Genron NPO Public Opinion Survey on Mutual Perceptions of Korea-Japan Relations





# Failure of “two-track” approach and costly conflicts

\* Underestimate strategic/security and economic values of the other.

1. Rise in popular threat perception of Japan → Weakening of US-Japan-SK security cooperation → Weakening of cooperation vis-à-vis NK; ROK-US alliance; Affecting South Korea-US relations negatively

- Biden admin's push to improve bilateral relations: separating historical issues and strategic benefits

2. Regional strategy in trouble

‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) led by Japan, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and distancing have led to the decline of diplomatic influence in the region


3. Economic costs:

- Decline in bilateral trade and FDI
- Trade retaliations, ineffective

4. Earn cheap applause


Powers who maintain their vested interests and political interests by tapping into ‘anti-Japanese sentiment’

## Security costs: Which country is a military threat?(2020)



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
# Reasons why Japan is a military threat? (2020)



	Because Japan still has ambiguous attitudes towards its war responsibility	Because Japan has been claiming sovereignty over Dokdo	Because right wing tendencies are found in Japanese politics	Because an Act related to Japan's right for collective self-defense has been passed	Because Japan seems to be moving toward becoming a military power	Because Japan is sieging China along with the US	Others	No special reason	No reply
2020	44.5%	58.0%	41.7%	29.6%	34.6%	9.9%	0.0%	1.4%	0.0%
2019	47.2%	56.0%	32.9%	27.2%	30.1%	5.7%	0.0%	0.5%	1.6%


Copyright(c) 2020 The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute All Rights Reserved.

## Economic costs: K-J Trade and FDI, 2011-20.




# Trade retaliations, effective? (2019-21)

Korea's trade deficit vis-à-vis Japan (One million \$)




\*2021 data shows the balance of trade from January-June




## Economic interdependence and its resilience

- The success of both the Abe admin's export restrictions and Moon admin's "Materials, Parts and Equipment Independence Policy" are in question
- The import of semiconductor equipment increased by 31% from January - June, 2021
- South Korea and Japan are closely interdependent while being at the center of the semiconductor supply chain.
- Highly resilient from export or import regulations (localization)

輸出管理対象3品目でフッ化水素の輸入は減少した




## (2) US-China Hegemonic Rivalry 2030, 2050




Year	2020	2030	2040	2050
US GDP	\$ 20,067,000,000,000	\$ 23,436,000,000,000	\$ 26,772,000,000,000	\$ 30,629,000,000,000
Chinese GDP	\$ 13,983,000,000,000	\$ 23,126,000,000,000	\$ 28,522,000,000,000	\$ 31,484,000,000,000
GDP to the ratio of defense budget	3.5% / 1.7%	3.0% / 1.7%	2.8% / 1.9%	2.6% / 2.2%
Trends in the US defense budget	\$ 702,345,000,000 (SIPRI: \$ 778,282,000,000)	\$ 703,080,000,000	\$ 749,616,000,000	\$ 796,354,000,000
Trends in China's defense budget	\$ 237,711,000,000 (SIPRI: \$ 252,304,000,000)	\$ 393,142,000,000	\$ 541,918,000,000	\$ 692,648,000,000
Trends in the ratio of defense budget (approximate value)	3:1		3:2	1:0.87 (8:7)

### 2030: Long-term global GDP rankings



- Middle power's dilemma
- Japan without Korea, or Korea without Japan?

(ars)  
ected



Source: Governments, Japan Center for Economic Research (projections)

### (3) Power Shift between Japan and Korea

GDP forecast based on per-capita PPP in South Korea and Japan

Per-capita GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP): An indicator that measures people's practical purchasing power while reflecting each country's different prices and exchange rates



Source/International Monetary Fund (IMF)


Reporter Kim Young-eun / 20190811

Twitter @yonhap\_graphics Facebook tuney.kr/LeYN1

Yonhap News Agency

The trends of increasing defense expenditure in South Korea and Japan

Unit: KRW ※Applied an annual increase of 6% for South Korea and 1.3% for Japan (based on recent 5 year data)



JoongAng Ilbo

## Korea: Redesign and Reconstruct

### 1. Overcoming Japan syndrome

- A need to overcome several factors buried within people's consciousnesses such as harboring a sense of humiliation toward Japan (Japanese colonial rule), a sense of inferiority (playing catch-up with modern civilization), and a sense of moral superiority (vs. the Japanese older generation's sense of superiority over, disregard for, and anxiety toward Korea)

### 2. Broader and longer-term perspective: 3- track

- competition
- cooperation
- confrontation

# Agendas for the next government

- Resolve the pending historical issues (Japanese military sexual slavery/forced mobilization) at an early stage
- Cooperate on regional and global issues from a multilateral perspective
- Coordinate on views of China
- Long-term efforts to shared identity



# The Structural Transformation of South Korea-Japan Relations amid the US-China Strategic Rivalries and North Korean Nuclear Crisis: What is our choice?



**KIMIYA Tadashi**

Professor, The University of Tokyo

- 2010 ~ Present: Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo
- 2015 ~ 2018: Director, The Center for Korean Studies, The University of Tokyo
- 2012 ~ 2014: Director, The Center for Contemporary Korean Studies, The University of Tokyo
- 2002 ~ 2003: Visiting Scholar, Harvard Yenching Institute
- 1996 ~ 2009: Associate Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo
- 1993 ~ 1996: Associate Professor, Hosei University
- 1986 ~ 1992: Graduate School of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University
- 1983 ~ 1993: Graduate School Student, Graduate School of Law and Politics, The University of Tokyo
- 1978 ~ 1983: Undergraduate School Student, Faculty of Law, The University of Tokyo

## Biography

Prof. Kimiya graduated from the Faculty of Law, the University of Tokyo and completed doctoral studies in the Graduate School of Politics. He received his Ph.D. in Korean politics from the Graduate School of Korea University. He has developed his study focusing on the Korean politics and diplomacy, and Korea-Japan relations during not only the Cold War, but also the post-Cold War era.

His works as books by the single author include, "Korea: Its Economic Development and Democratization", "Korean Contemporary History in the international politics", "North and South Korean Contemporary History Focusing on their Nationalism", "The History of Relations between South Korea and Japan" in Japanese, "Political Choice of the Park Chung Hee Government: Its Export-led Industrialization and the Cold War regime during the 1960s", "The Japanese Diplomacy Toward ROK : Decolonization, the Cold War, and Economic Cooperation" in Korean.





# The Structural Transformation of South Korea-Japan Relations amid the US-China Strategic Rivalries and North Korean Nuclear Crisis: What is our choice?

KIMIYA, Tadashi

Professor, Graduate School of Arts and  
Sciences, The University of Tokyo

August 26, 2021

## Contents

- 1 The Structural Transformation of the South Korea-Japan Relations
- 2 How to deal with our bilateral problems
- 3 The Common Environments South Korea and Japan Share, but Different Approach?

## 1 Structural Transformation of the S K-J Relations

① Horizontalization in terms of power and division of labor  
The power balance has become more horizontal or equal and the economic division of labor has become from vertical to horizontal.

② Commonalization in terms of regime value  
Shared values(Political Democracy and Market Economy) are spreading in each country's institutions.

## 1 Structural Transformation of the S K-J Relations

③ Diversification in terms of Actors and Areas  
The South Korea-Japan relations are becoming more diverse and multi-tiered in terms of actors and areas.

④ Bilateral and Balanced Interaction from Unilateral and Unbalanced Interaction in terms of Concern, Information, and Value  
Mutual concern, informative direction, and value interaction is becoming more equal in quantitative terms.

## 1 Structural Transformation of the S K-J Relations

Vertical  $\Rightarrow$  Horizontal

Different  $\Rightarrow$  Similar

Simple  $\Rightarrow$  Pluralistic

Unilateral and Unbalanced  $\Rightarrow$  Bilateral and Balanced

Asymmetrical  $\Rightarrow$  Symmetrical

## 1 Structural Transformation of the S K-J Relations

Asymmetrical and Complementary (~1990)

Anti-communist cooperation in search of SK superiority over NK based on economic cooperation for the sake of our national security, which would be achieved.

Japan was more tolerant toward SK because SK was important for Japan's national security and Japan was not so sensitive to SK's criticism against Japan.

SK refrained from aggressively rebuking Japan because SK regarded the Japan's cooperation as vital not only to achieve economic development but also to win the regime contest against NK.

# 1 Structural Transformation of the S K-J Relations

Asymmetrical and Complementary(~1990)

SK authoritarian regime could suppress its domestic opposition due to its cooperation with Japan.

Japan's democracy and SK's authoritarianism, which appeared to be contrastive, were actually complementary in terms of contributing our regimes' resilience.

# 1 Structural Transformation of the S K-J Relations

Symmetrical and Competitive(1990~)

Japan and SK have been more competitive in search of superiority in terms of power contest.

Japan and SK have shared the common regime value, advanced market democracy. On the one hand, it is easier for us to understand each other, but our understanding and modus operandi of the regime is much different according to our different history and culture.

Justice

J: procedural justice, keeping promise

SK: substantive justice, consent by the suffered, reparation for violation of human rights

Democracy

J: representative democracy, peace and stability

SK: direct democracy, democratizing the existing democracy by popular movement

# 1 Structural Transformation of the S K-J Relations

Symmetrical and Competitive(1990~)

It is a fact that our relations have been diversified.

But is it really our diversified relations are relatively independent or autonomous from the governmental political relations based on exclusive nationalism ?

It is good for us to understand each other based on balanced interactive communication, but are we more sensitive and vulnerable due to each other's aggressive hostilities ?

# 1 Structural Transformation of the S K-J Relations

How Competitive?

Competitive Collaboration based on the good-will competition?

We can advance our mutual quality of life and our presence in the global society by competitive collaboration in absolute terms.

Exclusive Competition based on the zero-sum games?

We can catch up with or acquire the superiority over the other only by beating the other at all costs in relative terms.

# 1 Structural Transformation of the S K-J Relations

It depends on our political choice not only of our political leaders but also of our civil societies.

The conflictive tensions between us are so serious that we cannot overcome them easily.

By looking around us, however, we know that we are in such difficult situations that we cannot overcome the difficulties by either one's exclusive power and effort.

## 2 How to deal with our bilateral problems

It is a fact that the history problems between SK and J are so important that neither SK nor J cannot easily make a compromise with each other because they are deeply related with each other's identity.

SK regards them as those between justice and injustice, or those between the victims and the perpetrators, so that J has to apologize and compensate for SK to the extent that SK's victims feels convincing or satisfactory.

J regards them as legal and diplomatic ones, so that SK has to keep the agreement that the problems due to the Japanese colonial rule had been resolved completely and finally by the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1965.

## 2 How to deal with our bilateral problems

It is also a fact that the problems related with national security or national survival are as important as the problems related with national identity.

If both SK and J, or either SK or J, regard our mutual collaboration as necessary for our national security and survival, but regard the intensified conflicts due to the history problems lying between us as detrimental for our collaboration, which alternatives shall we choose?

If both of us, or either of us, regard the problems related with the national identity or our different perceptions of history as more important and serious than those related with the national security or survival, we might choose the alternatives that we cannot but escalate the conflicts.

For us, such choice is rational?

## 2 How to deal with our bilateral problems

Why does not SK government try to respect not only SK rulings regarding the forced labor and the “comfort women” but also keeping the agreement between SK and J in 1965, and try creating a new scheme for achieving not only the rulings but also the agreement.

Why does not J government try supplementing the 1965 scheme in order to make 1965 agreement sustainable by collaborating with SK government?

It is a fact that both SK and J have continued such practices in order to make such incomplete arrangements sustainable not only under the asymmetrical complementary relations but also under the symmetrical competitive relations.

Why cannot we continue such practices any more?



## 2 How to deal with our bilateral problems

Relative marginalization of history problems

Two track approach which J adopted at one time, and SK tries to adopt now is insufficient.

History problems between SK and J are very important for us, but they should be marginalized compared with national security or survival.

Relative marginalization of history problems is different from bypassing them.

Relative marginalization of history problems means de-national-politicization of them.

De-national politicization means regarding the problem not as nation vs nation conflicting issues but as universal common ones we should collaborate to deal with such like human rights problem.

## 3 The Common Environments SK and J Share, but Different Approach?

① DPRK Factor

② China Factor or US-China Relations

③ US Alliance Factor



## ① DPRK: North Korean Factor

SK and J share the achievements of NK's denuclearization by peaceful means as our common interest.

But

From the J views,

SK might regard good relations between NK and SK as more important than NK's denuclearization. Such policy might be detrimental for the Japanese security interest.

From the SK views,

J might play an obstructive role for SK to take initiative in building the Korean peace regime, especially by appealing to US.

Japan's role is never collaborative but obstructive.

## ① DPRK: North Korean Factor

SK(Moon Jae-In's) diplomacy

engaged both US and DPRK into the US-DPRK negotiation for DPRK denuclearization and the US-DPRK normalization

depended on President Trump's arbitrary expectation for DPRK's denuclearization.

depended on Chairman Kim Jung Un's anxious expectation for the US-DPRK normalization.

engaged China into the DPRK's denuclearization project more positively

## ① DPRK: North Korean Factor

SK diplomacy's success depended on the US-China collaboration at least regarding the DPRK's denuclearization project.

But the intensification of the US-China rivalries or hostilities might make such de facto collaboration more and more difficult.

Why does not SK persuade J to join the Korean Peace Process initiated by SK not only for SK national interest but also for J national interest?

Why does not J encourage SK to initiate the Korean Peace Process in order to achieve the J national interest? J has the other alternatives to achieve J national interest instead of collaborating with SK?

## ① DPRK: North Korean Factor

Is it really that SK policy and J policy are so much different, even antagonistic regarding NK?

Is it really that SK regards the collaboration with J as unnecessary to achieve K peace process?

SK policy in terms of not only the policy objectives but also of the policy means is relatively similar with J policy compared with that of other countries, US, China, Russia, and so on.

Why do not SK and J try to collaborate with each other based on the relatively common interests regarding the policy toward NK?

Why do not SK and J try to come to terms with each other regarding the policy toward NK taking our common interests and the limits of our individual capacity into serious consideration?

## ② China Factor or US-China Relations

### Common Interest

Both SK and J seriously want to avoid the tremendously intensified, dangerous relations between US and China.

Both SK and J want to avoid the US-China dual-hegemony in which SK and J cannot acquire maneuverable space.

But

### Divergence

SK prefer relatively good relations between US and China because of its dependence on US militarily and China economically, and both US and China in terms of North Korean policy.

J prefer relatively intensified relations between US and China to some extent taking the necessity of upgrading the Japanese presence in the US strategy against China into serious consideration.

## ② China Factor or US-China Relations

The US-China Rivalries were intensified in terms of security, trade, and technology.

SK Diplomacy: **Dependent on the alliance with US** in terms of military security, **Dependent on China** in terms of economy, trade and investment, **Dependent both on US and China** in terms of the solving the DPRK problem including the denuclearization, the peaceful regime, and the coming reunification.

J Diplomacy: Dependent on the alliance with US to counterbalance the rising China, but keeping temporal good relations with China by taking advantage of the Chinese strategy that it wants to keep good relations with Japan amid the US-China rivalries.

## ② China Factor or US-China Relations

SK diplomacy will be unsustainable under the US-China New Cold War because US, China, and DPRK might lose incentives for promoting DPRK's denuclearization project in return for the US-DPRK normalization.

SK is powerful enough to make US and China collaborate for DPRK's denuclearization?

If not, SK diplomacy will be unsustainable.

## ② China Factor or US-China Relations

J diplomacy is sustainable?

J government hopes the intensification of the US-China rivalries is preferable for consolidating the alliance with US because US will regard the J presence more seriously to counterbalance the Chinese rising power.

However, J cannot control the intensification of the US-China rivalries within the range that J is not seriously damaged.

J might be seriously damaged due to the uncontrollable intensification of the US-China rivalries.

J diplomacy based on such uncontrollable US-China rivalries will be also unsustainable.

## ② China Factor or US-China Relations

The Sustainable and preferable SK and J diplomacy should be based on the US-China rivalries within the range that both SK and J can maintain its relative autonomy.

It is unsustainable amid the escalation of fierce US-China rivalries which neither SK nor J can control.

It is also unsustainable amid the US-China joint hegemony which ignores either interest of SK or J.

## ② China Factor or US-China Relations

Why do not SK and J try to collaborate with each other in order to get more preferable geopolitical conditions despite the fact that neither SK diplomacy nor J diplomacy is sustainable under the uncontrollable US-China fierce conflicts?

Why do not SK and J try to collaborate with each other in order to contain the US-China conflicts within the range that SK and J suffer from the damages at minimum and SK and J take advantage of them at maximum despite the fact that we might be able to do only if we collaborate with each other by overcoming the differences due to our conflicts between ourselves?

### ③ US Factor

#### Common Interest

Both SK and J can take advantage of Military Alliance with USA at minimal cost.

US has played a catalyst or mediator role between SK and J.

#### But

#### Divergence

SK and Japan compete for US exclusive support beating the other regarding the conflictive bilateral problems between SK and J.

US takes advantage of the SK and J's loyalty competition for its own national interests.

### ③ US Factor

Why do not SK and J try to overcome the differences due to our conflicts in order to take advantage of our shared alliance with US not only at minimal cost but also at maximal benefit?

Why do not SK and J try to take advantage of our shared alliance with US in order to maximize our mutual interests and minimize our burden sharing due to the alliance?

It is difficult for SK and J to share security alliances taking our shared history as colonizer and colony into serious consideration, but we can collaborate with each other in order to maximize our benefits due to our shared alliances with US.

## SK-J relations regarding NK, China, US

SK is not powerful enough to make such preferable US-China relations and SK-NK relations by oneself.

J is not powerful enough to make such preferable US-China relation and NK-J relations by oneself, either.

The collaboration between SK and J might not be powerful enough to do it, either.

But it might be relatively more powerful enough to do it rather than either SK or J does alone.

Why don't SK and J choose such possible course?

We regard the problem lying between us as more important and vital than the problem that we must deal with in order to keep our security?

1 Overemphasis on history problems

2 Downgrading each other in terms of one's diplomacy

Other is regarded not only as unimportant but also as detrimental of one's achieving national interest.

↓

1 Relative marginalization of such difficult problems like history problems

2 Reevaluation of the other reasonably in terms of one's diplomacy under the similar environment, values, power,

↓

We cannot collaborate because of our bilateral problems? No.

We have to overcome our common difficulties and moreover we can create new values only by relatively marginalizing our bilateral problems.





# Schadenfreude is not Recommended

## Brad GLOSSERMAN

Deputy Director, Center for Rule making Strategies, Tama University



- 2017.10 ~ Present: Deputy Director / Visiting Professor, Center for Rule-Making Strategies, Tama University
- 2017.10 ~ Present: Senior Advisor, Pacific Forum
- 2014 ~ Present: English Managing Editor, Journal of The New Asia Research Institute
- 2005 ~ 2017: Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS
- 2001 ~ 2005: Director of Research, Pacific Forum CSIS
- 1991 ~ 2001: Editorial Board Member, The Japan Times

## Biography

Brad GLOSSERMAN is Deputy Director of and Visiting Professor at the Center for Rule-making Strategies, Tama University. He is also a Senior Adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum, in Honolulu Hi, where he served for 13 years (2004-2017) as executive director.

Brad is the author of *Peak Japan: The End of Grand Ambitions* (Georgetown University Press, 2019; a Korean edition was released in 2020 by Korean Copyright Center) and co-author (with Scott Snyder) of *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash* (Columbia University Press 2015). He is the editor, with Tae-hyo Kim, of *The Future of U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Balancing Values and Interests* (CSIS, 2004). He is also the English-language editor of the journal of the New Asia Research Institute (NARI) in Seoul. A frequent participant in US State Department visiting lecture programs and the US Navy's Regional Security Education Program, he speaks at conferences, research institutes and universities around the world. His commentary regularly appears in media around the globe. He has written dozens of monographs and articles on US foreign policy and Asian security relations and he has contributed numerous chapters to books on regional security.

He was for 10 years a member of the editorial board of The Japan Times and continues to serve as a contributing editor. He now writes a weekly column on foreign policy and international affairs for the paper. He is an adjunct lecturer at the Management Center of Innsbruck (MCI). He has a JD from the George Washington University National Law Center, an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a BA from Reed College.



# Schadenfreude is not Recommended

Remarks to the International Symposium  
Discussing Great Transformation in South Korea-Japan Relations  
Brad Glosserman, Center for Rule Making Strategies  
August 26, 2021

## 1. The conclusions of Peak Japan

- a. Japan is a small ‘c’ conservative country: Hesitant to embrace change given the comfort.  
Prefers stability to dynamism
- b. Inward-looking (uchimuki) and increasingly disengaged from world
- c. Structural factors (demographics, debt) provide constraints
- d. Japan is changing, but not fast enough: Schaefer’s “pockets of excellence” and domination of key production nodes, but not sufficient.

## 2. Japan’s leadership rejects my analysis.

- a. Abe counters my conclusions (CPTPP, FOIP, energy and activism). But he is unique - vision and understanding of political system and pragmatism -- and his line isn’t sustainable.  
Reverting to traditional LDP politics.
- b. Engagement with ROK as proof: locked in and unwilling to compromise. Ignores strategic reality.  
Bottom line: No trust.
- c. Japan misjudges ROK relationship with China. Worries about swing into China’s orbit. Inaccurate, but others - including South Koreans - don’t get that right.  
All mislearned lessons of THAAD.

## 3. The lessons of Peak Japan

- a. Demographics are a big drag.
- b. Too much success encourages complacency
- c. BIG change required - not ‘neoliberalism’ but shift in social goals and outlook
- d. Innovation is key but older population less entrepreneurial (and young are risk averse).  
Have to accept failure.

## 4. Lessons for Korea

- a. Avoid Schadenfreude - evident in Olympic coverage.
- b. Korea distracted by domestic politics and North Korea. Failure to keep pace with larger systemic change.
- c. Focus on productivity: empower women and open the doors to immigrants
- d. Stay engaged with world, don’t become inward obsessed; study English

## 5. More broadly, to fix ROK-Japan relations

- a. Look forward, not back; focus on the future, not the past
- b. Decide whether it wants the moral high ground or a partner
- c. Create space for Japanese who understand strategic realities and want the ROK as a partner.



International Symposium

## Discussing Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations

How to Re-establish ROK-Japan Relations Ushering  
in an Era of Momentous Shift

### Session 3

# Direction and Strategies for the Re-establishment of ROK-Japan Relations

Moderator:

**JO Yanghyeon**

Professor, Center for Japanese Studies, KNDA



- 2018.03 ~ Present: Head, The Center for Japanese Studies, IFANS, KNDA
- 2006.06 ~ Present: Professor, The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, KNDA
- 2018.10 ~ 2019.04: Visiting Fellow, The East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore
- 2011.08 ~ 2012.01: Academic Associate, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
- 2011.04 ~ 2018.02: Director, The Center for Diplomatic History Studies, IFANS, KNDA





# ROK's Middle Power Diplomacy and the Redefinition of ROK-Japan Relations: Challenges and Prospect

**NAM Kijeong**

Professor, Institute for Japanese Studies, SNU



- 2019.12 ~ Present: Member, The Presidential Commission on Policy Planning
- 2009 ~ Present: Professor, Institute for Japanese Studies, Seoul National University
- 2019.01 ~ 2019.12: President, Korean Association of Contemporary Japanese Studies
- 2011.03: Visiting Professor, School of Law, Tohoku University
- 2010.01 ~ 2010.02: Visiting Professor, Institute for Social Science, The University of Tokyo
- 2005.03 ~ 2009.06: Assistant Professor/Associate Professor, Department of International Studies, Kookmin University
- 2001.04 ~ 2005.02: Assistant Professor/Professor, Graduate School of Law, Tohoku University

## Biography

NAM Kijeong currently serves as Humanities Korea (HK) professor at the Institute for Japanese Studies, Seoul National University (SNU), Korea. He graduated from SNU and received his Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo. The title of his doctoral thesis is *The Korean War and Japan: War and Peace in 'Base State'*. He worked as an assistant professor, and tenure professor at Tohoku University from 2001 to 2005, and also at Kookmin University from 2005 to 2009. His recent works include, *The Birth of a Base State: Japan's Korean War* (in Korean, SNU Press, 2016), "Citizens' Solidarity for the Relationship between Korea and Japan in the New Korean Peninsula System" (The Quarterly Changbi, 2020), "Linking peace with reconciliation: Peace on the Korean Peninsula and the Seoul-Pyongyang-Tokyo triangle" (*Asian Education and Development Studies*, 2019), and "Similar Conditions, Different Paths?: Japan's Normalization of Relations with Korea and Vietnam" (*Journal of Contemporary Korean Studies*, 2015).





# South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy and Redefinition of ROK-Japan Relations -- Challenges and Outlook --

August 26, 2021

NAM Kijeong

Institute for Japanese Studies, Seoul National University

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
## Korea-Japan relations in ‘long term, low-intensity and complex competition’

- Worsening ROK-Japan relations are the result of △ the strategic competition between the US and China caused by the emergence of China as a new superpower on the global level, the relative decline of Japan, and South Korea’s takeoff as a middle power; △ the severance of a bilateral political and economic network between South Korea and Japan, the symmetrization and horizontalization of ROK-Japan relations due to the convergence of a different national power between South Korea and Japan, thereby turning ROK-Japan relations into typical bilateral relations wherein both countries compete on the global stage; and △ the acceleration of the conservative swing in Japanese domestic politics and the emergence of a liberal government in South Korea, all of which further aggravate the countries’ bilateral perceptions of each other.
- The start of ROK-Japan strategic competition amidst intensifying Sino-US strategic competition, and long-term ‘low-intensity and complex competition’ in ROK-Japan relations that has taken on aspects of a cold war.


## Convergence of Korea and Japan’s National Powers: Symmetrization and Horizontalization

- According the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, South Korea ranked 28<sup>th</sup> and Japan 30<sup>th</sup> in 2019, and South Korea 23<sup>rd</sup> and Japan 34<sup>th</sup> in 2020.
- According to OECD data, South Korea outstrips Japan in 2018 per-capita GDP when calculated on the basis of purchasing power parity (South Korea: USD 42,135 and Japan: USD 41,501).
- In 2019, Korea appeared to be 2 notches higher than Japan for many indicators of sovereign rating.
- In 2020, Monocle magazine of the UK has ranked South Korea second after Germany in terms of soft power.
- According to the Democracy Index compiled by The Economist, Japan ranked 24<sup>th</sup>/22<sup>nd</sup>/23<sup>rd</sup>/ and South Korea 23<sup>rd</sup>/21<sup>st</sup>/20<sup>th</sup> in 2019, 2018 and 2017 respectively.
- Since Japan’s export restrictions, the proportion of people who recognize South Korea as more of an advanced country increased almost twofold, climbing from 17% to 31%, whereas those who recognize Japan as more of an advanced country decreased from 1/2 to 1/3.


## Reduction in GDP per-capita



## Reduction in the Defense Spending gap



# Reduction in the National Power Gap between South Korea and Japan



# South Koreans Overcoming Their Complex with Japan

The percentage of people who think of South Korea as more of an advanced country than Japan increased to 31%, which is a 14%-point rise from August of last year



Question: All things considered, who do you think is more of an advanced country between South Korea and Japan?

Number of respondents: 1,000 respondents for each survey

Hanook Research's regular survey  
"Public Opinion within Public Opinion" (hwopinair.co.kr)

## Korea's Middle Power Mentality and Diplomacy

- Aforementioned changes gave the Korean people an awareness that their country is on par with Japan, which invigorated public demand for change and adjustment in Korea-Japan relations. There is a growing interest in Korea's soft power based on such success and thus a possibility of middle power diplomacy.
- In accordance with Korea's revamped international status, their foreign policy toward Japan should steer away from the two-track approach and instead pursue middle power diplomacy.
- The two-track approach is passive diplomacy that focuses on managing issues and maintaining the status quo. In contrast, middle power diplomacy toward Japan is a proactive diplomacy, which aims at forming a partnership with Japan by building diverse cooperative frameworks for regional stability and prosperity.
- Regarding dispute over history, however justified it may be, unilaterally demanding concession and submission from Japan is not in line with middle power diplomacy.

## South Korea's middle power diplomacy and its origin

- December 3, 1987, Maeil Business News Korea, awareness as a middle power that ranked 14th largest exporter to refrain from dumping in overseas markets and exporting low-price, low-quality goods.
- 1995, Korea was elected as a member of the UN Security Council, which was seen as 'a major watershed in the history of Korean diplomacy'.
- 1996, established a goal to secure Korea's status as a middle power, acting as a bridge between EU and ASEAN.
- April 1998, "Korea is one of the higher-ranking countries among middle powers," Lee Si Young, the then newly-appointed Korean ambassador to the UN.
- 2004-2005, during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, discussions on middle power diplomacy flourished.
- 2010s, presented middle power diplomatic policy plans as the tenth-largest economy in the world.
- The Park Geun-hye administration proposed plans on 'responsible middle power diplomacy' (MIKTA).
- The Moon Jae-in administration's middle power diplomatic strategy: Presented as a plan to serve as a 'bridging nation'.

## From a middle power to a middle way power

- Going beyond middle power cooperation to establish a middle way power network
- Middle Way Power
- In this term, 'middle' does not mean 'between the two', but to detach from two opposite poles or to overcome antinomies.
- The middle way/path is on no occasion value relativism; it is the denial of an absolute existence or value, or it is based on disbelief. It pledges the possibility of an awareness of 'international relations as an *Indrajala*,' a Buddhist world view, on the grounds of the enlightenment of existential relativity in diplomacy.
- A world view based on the doctrine of dependent origination, meaning all beings exist within connected relations, is the world of hyper-connected society.
- In the world of dependent origination, communitarianism and liberalism restores unity,

## Middle way power diplomacy

- Middle way diplomacy must always remain vigilant in adhering to diplomacy based on prudence and timeliness, and in finding the optimal balance/time to hit the mark among various options/points in time, not opposite poles.
- Middle way powers are repositories of ideologies, trailblazing the civilization to a new dimension as bridging nations between civilized nations.
- Middle way is an act of choosing an option and focusing on it, taking relations and situation into consideration (Sangyong Choi).
- Middle way power diplomacy modifies the concept of diplomacy as a traditional conduct pursuing national interest.
- Diplomacy as a conduct that acknowledges differences and adjusts, finds or creates the optimal solution of middle way, and seeks the optimal (best possible) option, neither the best nor worst.

## 'Velocity Politics' and Korea-Japan Relations in the Post-COVID-19 Era

Paying attention to the velocity politics in the post-COVID-19 era

- Paul Virilio(*Speed and Politics*, 1977)
- Western Europe survived as protagonists (*survivant*) in world history because they were pro-active (*sur-vif*). In French, 'vif' means 'velocity', an amalgamation of meanings 'violence' and 'life'.
- Empire holds chronometric property. The advent of fleets enabled the creation of empires. Fleets made moving endlessly across time and space possible, resolving limits in distance to rule time.

In the COVID-19 pandemic, politics is the technique of directly controlling time.

- Response to the pandemic is a matter of speed as well as delay. Timing of testing, confirmation, and quarantine. Time needed for vaccine development and vaccination. Delaying the pandemic, etc.
- COVID-19 becomes endemic due to variants, as a virus only needs a day to cycle through a generation. Race between the time of virus and the time of humanity.

Korea and Japan have furnished systematic plans, measures, and culture in response to velocity politics.

## COVID-19 as a 'Normal Accident' and ROK-Japan relations

- "...interactive complexity and tight coupling—system characteristics—inevitably will produce an accident..."
- Charles Perrow(*Normal Accidents*, 1984)
- A response method on COVID-19 as a normal accident, efforts to modify tight coupling to loose coupling and scale down from globalization to localization. Localization does not indicate discontinuities between regions, but to return to a reasonable level of connection from excessive connection. (Cho Hyun-chul, 23-28)
- A reasonable level of connection is a re-establishment of relations respecting each region's distinct diversity.
- A transition to a world order of communitarianism recognizing individual actor's identity from a liberalist world order ruled by unified, universal values.


## South Korea and Japan's performance in containing COVID-19 (International Comparison)

Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases per million people

Shown is the rolling 7-day average. The number of confirmed cases is lower than the number of actual cases, the main reason for that is limited testing.

Our World in Data

LINEAR LOG



## COVID-19, a Balance between Guns and/or Butter? Communitarianism?

(As of August 2020)

	Confirmed cases	Confirmed cases per million people	Deaths	Deaths per million people	Nuclear warheads deployed to operational missions	Total number of nuclear warheads possessed	Military power	Military expenditure	Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP	Number of sickbeds per 1,000 people	Healthcare expenditure	HAQ Index	Number of doctor visits per capita	Medical expenditure as a percentage of GDP
US	5613183	16958	173772	525	1750	6185	2141900	6488	3.4	2.8	12.0	81	4.0	16.9
China	84871	59	4634	3	0	290	2693000	2500	1.9	4.3	—	74	—	—
Japan	55667	440	1099	9	0	0	303157	466	0.9	13.1	18.6	89	12.6	10.9
South Korea	15761	307	306	6	0	0	5827150	431	2.7	12.3	20.9	86	16.6	8.1




## ROK-Japan Relations in the Anthropocene

- South Korea and Japan's joint response to the beginning of the mature Anthropocene
  - David Grinspoon (*Earth in Human Hands*, 2016),
  - Distinguish between the proto-Anthropocene and mature Anthropocene
  - The proto-Anthropocene is an era wherein humanity changed the earth unconsciously.
  - The mature Anthropocene is an era wherein humanity controls the earth by reflecting on how to maintain a sustainable lifestyle.
- The mature society, and responsibilities of South Korea and Japan
  - Dennis Gabor(*The Mature Society*, 1972)
  - A society which values spiritual and cultural maturity following a population increase and economic growth coming to an end
  - Japan transformed from a growth society to a mature society in the 1990s
  - South Korea started discussions on a mature society since the mid 2010s.


## The Forefront of a Great Transformation in ROK-Japan Relations: Ecofeminism

- Issues triggered by COVID-19
- Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva (*Ecofeminism*, 1993)
- Thoughts that regard human beings as existing separately from nature and being superior to other creatures, therefore making them masters who can exploit nature, have their roots in the mechanical, military and androcentric views of the universe.
- Ecofeminism argues that human beings and nature should make peace for the sustainability of humanity and the earth, and that ecology and feminism will prepare the path for reconciliation so as to propel the ecofeminist's outlook on the world which centers around the earth and women.

## South Korea and Japan, Mature Countries (Comparison of Fertility Rates)



## South Korea and Japan, Mature Countries (Comparison of Suicide Rates)



## *“Kim Ji-Young, Born in 1982” Making breakthroughs in ROK-Japan Relations*

- August 2016: #GenderReversalinJapaneseSociety, #Reversal\_of\_men\_and\_women\_in\_Japanese\_society\_translation, #GenderReversalinSociety\_KoreanEdition, Stronger Together (@feminism\_for\_us)
- December 2018: Kim Ji-Young, Born in 1982. Published a Japanese edition,
- February 2019: Cho Nam-ju visited Japan
- 2019. Autumn edition. Literature. Special edition. Korean feminist literature in Japanese.
- December 2019: Complete collection of Korean feminist literature in Japanese
- May 2020: Published the novel version of Korean feminist literature in Japan
- August 2020: Trans, feminism: Read Kim Ji-Young, Born 1982 together (Zoom meeting, August 8th, 2020)
- 2020.10. The movie ‘Kim Ji-Young, Born in 1982’ was released

## World Politics of Love(Young-Sun Ha, 2019)

- Jean Jacques Rousseau, revisited.
  - Self-love (amour de soi) which pursues self-preservation as an individual and sympathy (pitié) which pursues the preservation of humanity as a whole
  - Applying self-love and other-love simultaneously so as to achieve universal harmony (harmonie universelle) wherein the ‘self’ and ‘others’ can live together
  - Solutions to the question of how individual countries and the entire world can live together can be found in a coalition of small states
  - Establishing a coalition of states is needed but its member states must be small
- The insight that a new paradigm enshrines aesthetic beauty

## South Korea and Japan's Mutual Help as Middle Way Powers Saves the Earth

- Self-help, Mutual help and Public help
  - Unification of self-help and public-help with the mediation of mutual-help
  - From a profit-sharing community that shares national profits to a responsibility-sharing community that practices love for humanity
- South Korea and Japan acting as intermediaries offering mutual help as middle way powers
  - The starting point was the 1998 Kim Dae-jung-Keizo Obuchi Declaration for a new Korea-Japan partnership
  - It originated from the point where the 'dreams of Koreans' and the 'dreams of the Japanese' coincide
  - Kim Dae-jung administration: National strategy of the People's Government and the Sunshine Policy
  - Keizo Obuchi administration: Japan's Goals in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

## The Ancient Futures of Korea and Japan

- Kim Dae-jung administration's National strategy and the Sunshine Policy
  - An aesthetically structured blueprint
  - Domestically, the integration of modern ethnic nationalism and self-reliant ethnic nationalism
  - 'Northeast Asia - Korean Peninsula Reconciliation - Peace Process' through joint declarations between ROK-Japan; ROK-DPRK; and DPRK-Japan.
  - Proposing the formation of the ASEAN +3 and 'the East Asia Vision Group'
- 'Japan's Goals in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium(2000.1.)'
  - Most aesthetically complete blueprint
  - The past history Japan should refer to is not the international cooperation of the 1920s but rather its goals in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
  - Insisting 'open national interest' and 'exchange with neighboring countries'(隣交, cooperation with Asian neighbors )'
  - Roles and responsibilities of Japan as a 'civilian power'

Thank you for being such an attentive audience.



# Japan and South Korea as Natural Partners: Concept and Common Agenda



**SOEYA Yoshihide**  
Professor Emeritus, Keio University

- 2020.04 ~ Present: Professor Emeritus, Keio University
- 2014.03 ~ 2014.05: Fellow, Korea Foundation
- 2013.08 ~ 2014.01: Japan Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center
- 2007.10 ~ 2013.09: Director, Institute of East Asian Studies, Keio University
- 2006.09 ~ 2007.02: Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University
- 1995.04 ~ 2020.03: Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University
- 1991.04 ~ 1995.03: Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University
- 1988.04 ~ 1991.03: Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University

## Biography

Yoshihide SOEYA is Professor Emeritus of Keio University, from which he retired in March 2020 after serving as a professor of political science at the Faculty of Law for 32 years. He received Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1987, majoring in world politics. Dr. Soeya served, in 1999–2000, the “Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century,” and, in 2010, the “the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era” both in the Prime Minister’s Office. He was also a member of the “Central Council on Defense Facilities” (2000–2009, Agency/Ministry of Defense), and of the Advisory Group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003–2013). His areas of interest are politics and security in East Asia, and Japanese diplomacy and its external relations. His recent publications in English include “Constitutional Revision Going Astray: Article Nine and Security Policy” Helen Hardacre, et al., eds, *Japanese Constitutional Revisionism and Civic Activism* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021); “Middle Power Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Era” *Issues & Studies*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (June 2020); and “The Rise of China in Asia: Japan at the Nexus” in Asle Toje, ed., *Will China’s Rise be Peaceful? Security, Stability, and Legitimacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).





# Japan and South Korea as Natural Partners: Concept and Common Agenda

Yoshihide Soeya  
Professor Emeritus, Keio University

[Session 3] Direction and Strategies for  
the Re-establishment of South Korea-Japan Relations  
International Symposium:  
Discussing Great Transformation in South Korea-Japan Relations  
August 26, 2021 – Online


## Concept

- Advanced (&Divided) Democracies and Market Economies
- Geopolitical Proximity: the “Squeezed Middle” Between the United States and China (and potentially Russia)
- Historical and Cultural Bond
- Post-Modern Societies and Values
- Narrowing Power Gap

## “Comprehensive Power,” Lowy Institute Asian Power Index 2020



## “Military Capability,” Lowy Institute Asian Power Index 2020



## “2021 Military Strength Ranking,” *Global Firepower*

(<https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php>)

<b>1</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Japan</b>
	PwrIndx Score: 0.0718		PwrIndx Score: 0.1599
<b>2</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>South Korea</b>
	PwrIndx Score: 0.0791		PwrIndx Score: 0.1612
<b>3</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>France</b>
	PwrIndx Score: 0.0854		PwrIndx Score: 0.1681
<b>4</b>	<b>India</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
	PwrIndx Score: 0.1207		PwrIndx Score: 0.1997

## “People Stats 2011,” *Nation Master*


(<https://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/compare/Japan/South-Korea/People>)

STAT	• Japan	✱ South Korea
<u>Age distribution &gt; Median age</u>	<b>51.76 years</b> Ranked 8th.	<b>52.55 years</b> Ranked 5th. 2% more than Japan
<u>Age distribution &gt; Population aged 0-14</u>	<b>13.58%</b> Ranked 183th. 2% more than South Korea	<b>13.36%</b> Ranked 190th.
<u>Age distribution &gt; Population aged 15-24 &gt; Percent</u>	<b>9.47%</b> Ranked 185th. 4% more than South Korea	<b>9.12%</b> Ranked 192nd.
<u>Birth rate</u>	<b>8.23 births/1,000 population</b> Ranked 219th	<b>8.33 births/1,000 population</b> Ranked 218th. 1% more than Japan
<u>Mother's mean age at first birth</u>	<b>29.4</b> Ranked 1st.	<b>29.6</b> Ranked 2nd. 1% more than Japan
<u>Population growth</u>	<b>-0.339%</b> Ranked 167th	<b>-0.366%</b> Ranked 180th. 8% more than Japan

## South Korea: Japan's Third-Largest Trading Partner

- Only China (¥35.1 trillion) and the United States (¥24.5 trillion) have more significant trade relations with Japan-

**Value of Japan-South Korea Trade**



Compiled by Nippon.com based on trade statistics published by the Ministry of Finance.

nippon.com

## Foreign Trade of South Korea

<https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/analyse-markets/south-korea/foreign-trade-in-figures>

### Main Partner Countries

Main Customers (% of Exports)		Main Suppliers (% of Imports)	
	2019		2019
China	25.1%	China	21.3%
United States	13.6%	United States	12.3%
Vietnam	8.9%	Japan	9.5%
Hong Kong	5.9%	Saudi Arabia	4.3%
Japan	5.2%	Vietnam	4.2%
See More Countries	41.3%	See More Countries	48.4%

Source: Comtrade, Latest Available Data

## Bilateral Security Declarations between Middle Powers

- “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation”(March 13, 2007)
- “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India” (October 22, 2008)
- “Joint Statement on Enhanced Global and Security Cooperation between Australia and the Republic of Korea” (March 5, 2009)
- “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Australia and India” (November 12, 2009)

### “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation” (March 13, 2007)

The scope of security cooperation between Japan and Australia will include, but not be limited to the following:

- (i) law enforcement on combating transnational crime, including trafficking in illegal narcotics and precursors, people smuggling and trafficking, counterfeiting currency and arms smuggling;
- (ii) border security;
- (iii) counter-terrorism;
- (iv) disarmament and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
- (v) peace operations;
- (vi) exchange of strategic assessments and related information;
- (vii) maritime and aviation security;
- (viii) humanitarian relief operations, including disaster relief;
- (ix) contingency planning, including for pandemics

## “Joint Statement on Enhanced Global and Security Cooperation between Australia and the Republic of Korea” (March 5, 2009)

### Areas of Cooperation

1. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation and consultation on issues of common strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
2. Law enforcement to combat transnational crime, including trafficking in illegal narcotics and precursors, people smuggling and trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting currency and arms smuggling.
3. Border security
4. Counter-terrorism
5. Disarmament and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
6. Peacekeeping and other defence cooperation
7. Maritime Security
8. Development cooperation, with a focus on humanitarian operations, including disaster relief and management
9. Review of the Action Plan

## Toward “Middle Power Quad (MPQ)”

- From Bilateral to Trilateral
  - Japan-Australia-India
  - Japan-Australia-South Korea
- “Japan-South Korea” is a missing link, but:
  - GSOMIA
  - ACSA (previously some progress albeit limited)
  - New Southern Diplomacy of South Korea
- Re-designing of Japan-South Korea relations is the key toward MPQ
- MPQ as a step toward QUAD+  $\alpha$  (South Korea)

# Legal Issues between Korea and Japan: A Critical Review and Suggested Solutions

**RHEE Yongil**

Former Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Ivory Coast



- 2019 ~ Present: Ambassador for International Relations, Sejong City
- 2016 ~ 2019: Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Ivory Coast (as Non-Resident, Burkina Faso and Niger)
- 2006 ~ 2015: Counsellor of the Korean Embassy to Thailand, Minister Counsellor of the Korean Embassy to Romania, Minister Counsellor of the Korean Permanent Mission in Vienna and the Korea Embassy to Austria
- 2004 ~ 2006: Director, Treaties Division II, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- 2002: Lecturer for International Law, Ewha Womans University
- 1992: Lecturer for International Law, Ajou University
- 1992: Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Director, Division of International Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

## Biography

Yongil Rhee is currently Ambassador for International Relations of Sejong City which is the de facto administrative capital of South Korea. Prior to joining Sejong City, Amb. Rhee was, between 2016 and 2019, the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of South Korea to Ivory Coast (including Burkina Faso and Niger as the non-resident).

Amb. Rhee, having joined, as a career diplomat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea in 1992, has devoted himself to the promotion of international cooperation through diplomacy as well as, particularly, as a lawyer cum diplomat, contributed to development of the key international legal regimes i.e. the law of the sea, non-proliferation of WMD, international penal law including anti-corruption, international trade law, human rights and international humanitarian law, the law of treaties, international environment, development cooperation, etc. With around 28 years of experience in diplomacy, He held various positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea and its foreign posts. He was Director for the Treaties Division II of the ministry for 2004-2006, and served in Canada, Thailand, Romania, and Austria.

Amb. Rhee believes that international law is the minimum criteria to add value to national diplomacy and international peaceful order, and, as the case may be, will be able to bring in more reasonable and effective achievement thereto. He has been professionally so much involved in diverse international legal issues including with neighboring countries during his diplomatic career, also sometimes served as an international law lecturer in universities, and published several books amongst which are “Direct Applicability of International Treaties”(2014) and “Law on Division and Unification”(2020).

Amb. Rhee’s educational background includes a BA and a MA degree from Seoul National University with specialisation in international law.



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# Legal Issues between Korea and Japan: A Critical Review and Suggested Solutions

Yongil Rhee (Former Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Ivory Coast)

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## Legal War on the Past Issues

- Various legal issues have occurred thus far between Korea/Japan, concerning: comfort women, forced labor, territorial issues (sovereignty over Dokdo), WTO dispute settlement process on the Japanese Export Control, Fukushima water release, etc.
- Currently two issues are holding the Korea/Japan relations as hostage : **comfort women** and **forced labor issues**.

## Legal War on the Past Issues (detailed)

- ☞ The Korean Supreme Court's judgement against Nippon Steel (including Mitsubishi Heavy Industry) to pay reparations for Korean forced-labor victims from World War II (30-10-2018).
- ※ **Over 500 similar lawsuits** against 70 Japanese firms across Korean courts still to wait.
- ☞ A district court in Korea ordered Japan to pay reparations to 12 Korean women forced into sexual slavery by Japanese imperial troops (08-01-2021): finalized without an appeal from the Japanese side.
- ⇒ Denial of Japan's state immunity before a Korean local court on the ground of such crimes against humanity as excepting it.

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### Korean Gov't Positions on the Forced Labor Case

- The gov't respects the judicial branch's judgment on forced labor victims during the Japanese colonial occupation period.
- The Korean Supreme Court ruling **does not negate** the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Korea and Japan. Rather, it pertains to the scope of application of the treaty based on an acknowledgement of it.
- The government hopes to strengthen its bilateral relationship with Japan in a future-oriented manner.

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## Japan's Positions on the Forced Labor Case

- “Extremely regrettable and totally unacceptable” because it violates the 1965 Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation.

※1965 Agreement: the Japanese government, with final settlement of all the claims during the colonial period between Korea and Japan, including their nationals, committed to pay the South Korean government \$300 million in grants over a period of 10 years and to also provide \$200 million in low-interest loans.

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## Korean Gov't's Devaluing 2015 Comfort Women Agreement with Japan

“2015 Agreement with Japan over South Korean comfort women was seriously flawed and urged follow-up measures to resolve the contentious issue.”

- ※ 2015 deal: Japan apologized to former comfort women and provided 1 billion yen (\$8.8 million) to a fund to help them.

※ Japan refused any attempt by South Korea to revise the 2015 deal; it would make relations “unmanageable,” with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono saying the settlement had resulted from “legitimate negotiations.”

## **Japan's Positions on the Comfort Women Case**

**(statement by  
Japanese Foreign  
Minister  
Toshimitsu  
Motegi on Jan. 23,  
2021)**

"States are considered equal entities with sovereignty according to international law, and they do not submit to another country's jurisdiction as a rule."

"Based on this principle of sovereign immunity, we cannot submit to South Korean jurisdiction. This ruling is extremely dismaying and unacceptable as a patent violation of international law and the agreement between Japan and South Korea."

"I once again strongly insist that South Korea produce appropriate measures."

## **Korea's Positions on the Comfort Women Case**

"The Korean gov't respects the agreement reached on the comfort women issue in late 2015 and does not intend to "make any additional requests of Japan at the gov't level, but Japan needed to make sincere efforts to restore the victims' honor and dignity and heal their wounds based on a keen perception of responsibility and a spirit of apology and remorse as stated in that agreement."

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## Other Issues

- Dokdo Island (called in Japanese "Takeshima"): sporadically provoked by Japan about the Korean Sovereignty thereover.
- WTO dispute settlement process on the Japanese export control: just a consequential situation originating in the Korean judiciary judgement on forced labor.
- Fukushima water release: currently under IAEA process of expert monitoring, and yet to have such urgency as to file, based on the compulsory procedure of UNCLOS, a case to an international court.

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## Origin of the Issues: Legality of Japanese Colonial Rule (1910-45)

- **Illegal forceful occupation vs. Legitimate annexation - legal arguments on the legality of the annexation: flaws in the course of agreement (i.e. coercion)**
    - 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea stipulates in **Art.2**: "It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Korea and the Empire of Japan on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void."
- ⇒ **Divergence of interpretation on the annexation agreement in 1910**  
: *ab initio* invalide vs. invalidated since 1945

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### Origin of the Issues: Legality of Japanese Colonial Rule (1910-45)

- The illegality underlying the two judgements (on forced labor and comfort women) by the Korean judiciary:
  - Recognition of the Japanese annexation is not compatible with the basic principles and values of the Korean constitution
  - Thus, mobilization and conscription of the Koreans for war waging by Imperial Japan was *ultra vires* and illegal *ab initio*

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### Origin of the Issues: Legality of Japanese Colonial Rule (1910-45)

- Yet to have an authoritative decision on the legality.
- However, this matter is not to be determined on the basis of legal formality.
- 1945 Potsdam Declaration (the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender): "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine," as had been announced in 1945 Cairo Declaration ⇒ **Basic decision on Japan (who agreed unconditionally) by the then International Community.**



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## Origin of the Issues: Legality of Japanese Colonial Rule (1910-45)

- Korea (also Taiwan) allegedly annexed to Imperial Japan by the treaties was considered just after the Japanese surrender as reclaimed territories of the original sovereignties. Korea became independent and her government was recognized by UNGA in 1948, notwithstanding 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty (Japan's *ex officio* renunciation of the Korean peninsula)
- **In conclusion**, the alleged Japanese title to Korea (1910-45) has become **invalid retroactively**: no legitimacy of the Japanese colonial rule except acts performed in good faith.

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## Basic Questions: 1965 Korea/Japan Claims Settlement Agreement and its Scope of Settlement

1 ...the problems concerning property, rights, and interests of the two High Contracting Parties and their peoples ... and the claims between the High Contracting Parties and between their peoples ... have been settled completely and finally.

3... no claims shall be made with respect to the measures relating to the property, rights, and interests of either High Contracting Party and its people... or to all the claims of either High Contracting Party and its people arising from the causes which occurred prior to that date.

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### Basic Questions: 1965 Korea/Japan Claims Settlement Agreement and its Scope of Settlement

- Legal nature of the agreement: lump sum settlement of the claims *ratione temporis* for 1910-45
  - ✦ Almost impossible to have all the claims, individually or according to subject matter, settled; the gov'ts on behalf of the States and their nationals settled them.

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### Basic Questions: 1965 Korea/Japan Claims Settlement Agreement and its Scope of Settlement

- Scope of settlement *ratione materiae* : Whether tort-based claims settled?
  - All substantive legal rights with economic value (as defined by the Agreed Minutes of the Agreement) & claims.
  - Such tort-based claims as rights to demand "pay for damage" also included within this scope insofar as these claims related to financial (pecuniary) benefit.
  - The negotiating history on the controversies over the Japanese responsibility for the illegal colonial rule and cruelty: in principle, not to affect the scope prescribed in the Agreement.
  - ✕ Parol evidence rule, ordinary meaning rule of the treaty law.



## Basic Questions: 1965 Korea/Japan Claims Settlement Agreement and its Scope of Settlement

- **Definition of "claims" in the context of letter and spirit of the Agreement**

- After the liberation in 1945, vast number of claims, including those from war victims *vis-à-vis* Japan and its nationals could only be settled by the State agency (diplomatic authority) in terms of justiciability.

- Thus, "claims" themselves include in their ordinary meaning those of individuals, but such claim could only be raised and settled by the States who acted on the basis of diplomatic protection, not as the representatives of those individuals, but in their own rights.

※ Then no legal mechanism internationally set up for individuals' claims (i.e. a mixed claims commission allowing individuals to directly claim damages sometimes seen after big wars).

- Therefore, "claims" in the Agreement substantially containing individuals' ones, however, should be transformed as the claims of the states to each other in formality ⇒ understood through the negotiating history and subsequent practices that "claims" means "governmental rights/status based on diplomatic authority to claim"

## Basic Questions: 1965 Korea/Japan Claims Settlement Agreement and its Scope of Settlement

- **Whether settled individuals' claims by the Agreement?**

- Strongly argued that the claims settled in the Agreement are only the gov'ts' claims and their rights of diplomatic protection, but not individuals' claims. ➡ **Then no legal remedy for individuals' direct application!**

- No substance of individuals' claims, which is to be based on the substantive rights and to be concentrated into the gov'ts' hands to diplomatically claim.

- So called "individuals' claims" actually mean "tort-based claims" which belong to the legal rights settled in Art.2 insofar as they demand financial compensation.

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## Basic Questions: 1965 Korea/Japan Claims Settlement Agreement and its Scope of Settlement

- Legal effect of “settled” In Art.2. Para.1
  - Ambiguous meaning of “settled” in contrast to its Para.3 renouncing claims ➡ Rule of effectiveness (*ut magis valeat quam pereat*)
  - To be understood : “liquidated” or “concluded” so as not to raise an issue relating this settlement

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## Claims based on Delicts against Humanity

- Forceful conscription for forced labor and sexual slavery: then **already** international crimes:

Murder, extermination, enslavement, ... and other inhumane acts done against any civilian population, when such acts are done ... in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime.(Nuremberg Principles)

*Crimes against Humanity*: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war...

(Tokyo Charter)

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## Claims based on Delicts against Humanity

- Reparation for victims: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, guarantees of non-repetition ⇒ Obligations *erga omnes*.
- Yet to establish such an institutional entity to deal with claims by individual victims for reparations originating in delicts against humanity.
- Relation with the bilateral claims settlement agreement: Japan, as an author, should perform such obligations of reparation including investigation and fact-finding without prejudice to the provisions of that agreement.

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## Critique on the Korean Supreme Court's Reasoning of "Forced Labor" Case

- The Korean judiciary :
  - The issue of reparations arising out of Japan's unlawful acts against humanity that are directly related to Japan's illegal colonial rule and its war of aggression is not included within the scope of the 1965 Agreement.
  - Since the Agreement doesn't provide clearly whether individuals' claims was settled and the Japanese gov't also maintained the stance that individuals' right to claim reparations was not extinguished, such individuals' claims remain.
- Japan claims that the rulings by the Supreme Court on forced labor constitute a violation of this agreement; all issues pertaining to forced labor were completely and finally settled by the Agreement

### **Critique on the Korean Supreme Court's Reasoning of "Forced Labor" Case**

- 1965 Agreement settled as lump sum:
  - ◊ Substantive legal rights with economic or pecuniary value
  - ◊ Benefit claimed\* and right to claim (through a gov't)
    - \* i.e. "Eight Provisions of Claims by the Korea against Japan"
- ⇒ The tort-based claims, insofar as turning into pecuniary compensation and based on whatever grounds/causes, falling within the scope of settlement by the Agreement
- Individuals' claims: not distinguishable from the claims in general as prescribed in the Agreement
  - ◊ All the claims (caused for 1910-1945) concentrated and settled by governmental hands

### **Critique on the Korean Supreme Court's Reasoning of "Forced Labor" Case**

- Justiciability or *actio* for the claims from delicts against humanity: yet to be established for individual victims in terms of institutional arrangements and access to justice.
  - ※ hypothetical case: a Vietnamese claim based on the Geneva Conventions (international humanitarian law) against a Korean national in the Korean judiciary
- Direct applicability of the settlement by the Agreement: whether the settlement including individuals' claims should be directly effective on a domestic level ⇒ **Self-executing?**
  - ◊ Japan's legislative measure to invalidate all the Korean property, rights and interests within its jurisdiction to implement domestically this Agreement, referred to as a ground for non-self-executingness of this settlement provisions.

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### **Critique on the Korean Supreme Court's Reasoning of "Forced Labor" Case**

- Self-executingness up to the constitutional principles of each jurisdiction: the Judiciary's discretionary power ⇒ Advised to respect the longstanding practices of implementing the Agreement, meanwhile there has been no legislative measure in Korea to implement the provision of settlement *vis-à-vis* individuals.
- **Critique on the Japanese position to this case:**
  - Japan should not deny its own and its nationals' obligations of reparations arising out of their crimes against humanity, amongst which a pecuniary compensation is not included as settled by the Agreement.

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### **Critique on the Comfort Women case (Seoul District Court, Jan.8, 2021)**

- The court decision: Japan shall pay pecuniary compensations to the Victims:
  - by denying state or sovereign immunity for Japan
  - by applying the same reasoning as for the forced labor case for the merits (individuals' claims survived from the 1965 Agreement)
- As an exception of jurisdictional immunity of a State: wrongdoing against *jus cogens* ⇒ *Lex Ferenda*
  - Not so much compatible with the current international law on this subject matter
- The commitments made with the 2015 Deal to settle finally this issue.

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## Territorial Issue (Sovereignty over Dokdo Island)

- Endless conflicts around Dokdo between Korea/Japan.
- Both side claim historic titles.
- Japan indicates: in San Francisco Treaty ( **Art.2**), Dokdo was not included as the territories Japan renounced, despite the Korean side's efforts to be so.
- Our sovereignty over Dokdo, crystallized as the historic title, was once again confirmed by the Allies just after WWII:
  - "Supreme Command Allied Powers Instruction 677"(Jan.29, 1946): exclusion of Dokdo (Liancourt Rocks) from Japan, acting as proclaimed in 1945 Potsdam Declaration.
  - Korea became independent 1948 on the territory including Dokdo reclaimed with the liberation, regardless of 1951 San Francisco Treaty
  - *Uti Possidetis Juris*.

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## Possible Solutions

- Subrogation (payments) by the Korean gov't of the obligations to pay compensations delivered by the Korean judiciary to Japan and the Japanese firms, including those of following judgements:
  - To turn these legal lawsuits into G to G management
  - Both gov'ts' cooperation to find reasonable ways to deal with these gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law on an international as well as on a bilateral level
- Possibly to go to ICJ via UN's request for an advisory opinion in order to legally settle these issues of comfort women as well as forced labor
- To keep the territorial issue "frozen" without change of *status quo*.



**Thank You!**





## MEMO

